AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

May 12, 2023

(U) Report on Matters Related to Intelligence Activities and Investigations Arising Out of

the 2016 Presidential Campaigns

(U) Use or disclosure of any portions of this report marked “FISA” is subject to the
requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and may also be subject to the
June 25, 2020 order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in Docket Numbers 16-
1182, 17-52, 17-375, and 17-679. Portions marked “FISA” may be included in what is
provided to the Attorney General as part of this report. Such portions may not be used or
disclosed for any other purpose, including use or disclosure in any report made available to
Congress or the public, unless the Assistant Attorney General for National Security
confirms that the use or disclosure is authorized by FISA.

(U) Classified Appendix

(U) Introduction

(U) This Classified Appendix! forms a part of the Report on Matters Related to
Intelligence Activities and Investigations Arising Out of the 2016 Presidential Campaigns and
provides further information about the matters covered in three sections of the report: Section
[V.C.1 (Investigative referral of possible Clinton campaign plan); Section [V.B.1 (The threat of
foreign election influence by Foreign Government-2); and Section [V.D.1.a.ii (The Page FISA

application renewals).

(U) I.

(U) This section provides further factual background about (i) the possible Clinton
campaign plan described in the Office’s report; (ii) the Office’s efforts to verify or refute the
information about the plan; and (iii) the manner in which Department officials received and acted
on (or did not act on) the campaign plan information. The Office’s prosecution decisions related
to the plan are described in Section IV.C.2 of the unclassified report.

(U) Background: Sensitive Intelligence
T: in or about 2014, and continuing through at least in or
about , Individuals affiliated with Russian intelligence services hacked and gained unlawful
Classified by: John H. Durham
Derived from:
Declassifv on:
! (U) The OSC has carefully c ins classification review of the unclassified report and

this docume i i on that coordination and their reviews, the
oncur with the classifications.

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

access to emails of numerous U.S. public and private entities—including government agencies,
non-profit organizations, and think tanks based in the United States. Among the non-profit
organizations hacked by Russian government actors in 2016 was the Open Society Foundations,
formerly known as the Soros Foundation.”

Fron ou eI eis from oe
ource, referred to herein as a Í

the FBI, intelligence consisting of
We identify the information
ensitive Intelli itive Intelligence included (i) emails
hacking of U.S.-based communications,
eports analyzing the hacked U.S. materials, and (iii)
what appear or purport to be original hacked emails of U.S. persons (or portions of such
emails).* Two of the apparently hacked emails appear to have originated from the Open Society
Foundations. The purported author of these emails was Leonard Benardo, who was the Regional
Director for Eurasia at the Open Society Foundations.® In that capacity, Benardo oversaw efforts
relating to Russia and the former Soviet republics, among other countries.”

oo ne inf 0 16, the FBI received information
from TI relating to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, including reports written by

2 (UE see. e.g., OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Analyst-3 on December 10,
2019; OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Analyst-3 on September 17, 2019; OSC Report
of Interview o Employee-4 on February 27, 2020 at 1-6.

3 URE se. e.g., OIG, U.S. Department of Justice, A Review of Various Actions by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election,
Appendix One, at 2 (June 2018) (hereinafter “OIG Review of 2016 Election Actions, Appendix
One”); OSC Report of Interview of Intelligence Community (“IC”) Officer-2 on July 8, 2020;
OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Analyst-3 on December 10, 2019; OSC Report of
Interview of smployee-4 on February 27, 2020 at 1-4.

Bnn: agencies have needed to translate some of the Sensitive Intelligence.
More than one agency has translated some of the items.

> (U) See, e.g., OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-2 on July 8, 2020; OSC Report of
Interview of Headquarters Analyst-3 on December 10, 2019; OSC Report of Interview of IC
Officer-3 on July 8, 2020.

j lassified Appendix Document-1; OSC Report of Interview of IC
Officer-2 on July 8, 2020 at 6; OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Analyst-3 on December
10, 2019 at L, 4. For a general discussion of the versions of these reports, see also OSC Report
of Interview of IC Officer-3 on July 8, 2020. As to Benardo’s position, see OSC Report of
Interview of Leonard Benardo on May 21, 2021 at 1.

i ees Report of Interview of Leonard Benardo on May 21, 2021 at 1.

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erenced purported communications of Benardo
016, TI provided the U.S. government with two
a that described “confidential conversations”
between then-Democratic National Committee
asserman Schultz and two individuals at the Open Society Foundations (referred
to in the memoranda as the “Soros Foundation”) i.e., (i) Benardo and (ii) Jeffrey Goldstein who,

according to public sources, was senior policy advisor for Eurasia at the Open Societ
Fo ions? 016 memorandum, which was in Russian
tated in relevant part:

On January 12 of this year, during a confidential discussion with Jeffrey
Goldstein, a representative of the Soros Foundation on Eurasia, Democratic
Nationa! Committee Chairwoman Debbie Wasserman-Schultz characterized the

situation in her party in light of the growing scandal surrounding Hillary Clinton
as follows:

and others. In particular, in

Information released to the media in the last few days about FBI investigating
possible corruption relating to Department of State (under the leadership of
Clinton) preferential treatment of donors of the Clinton Foundation caused a
significant negative reaction inside the party. At the same time, the leadership of
the DP [TN: Democratic Party] had known about the information since June of
2015. According to Wasserman-Schultz, FBI, so far, does not have persuasive

evidence against Hillary Clinton because of the timely deletion of relevant data
from mail servers.

Obama has no intention to darken the final part of his presidency and “legacy” by
the scandal surrounding the main contender from the DP. To solve the problem,
the President puts pressure on FBI Director James Comey through Attorney
General Lynch, however, so far without concrete results.

Comey gravitates towards Republicans, and apparently, intends to prolong the
investigation so that the scandal would keep going until the presidential election
to jeopardize the chances of the DP to win the presidential race. '°

8 (U) OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Analyst-3 on December 10, 2019.

r See generally Classified Appendix Document 2; see also Jeff

50 stein, While a Good Man Sits in Prison, Open Society Foundations (May 16, 2010); Jeff
Goldstein, The World Bank Risks Dirtying lts Hands in Uzbekistan, International Labor Rights
Foundation (June 16, 2014) (both identifying Goldstein’s position)

10 (U) Classified Appendix Document-2; cf. OIG Review of 2016 Election Actions, Appendix One
at 6.

s Bs

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orandum, which was in Russian J
stated in relevant part:

During confidential contacts on March 5" with Leonard Bernardo [sic], Soros
Fund Eurasian Regional Director, Debbie Wasserman-Schultz, Chairperson of the
National Committee of the Democratic Party, characterized developments in the
pre-election campaign of Hillary Clinton in the following way.

In relation to the consensus reached among the Democratic Party (DP) leadership
regarding the candidacy of Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama sanctioned the use of
all administrative levers to remove possibly negative effects from the FBI
investigation of cases related to the Clinton Foundation and the email
correspondence in the State Department.

Based upon information from Wasserman-Schultz, the FBI does not possess any
kind of direct evidence against Clinton, because of their timely deletion from the
email servers. The political director of the Hillary Clinton staff, Amanda
Renteria, regularly receives information from Attorney General Loretta Lynch on
the plans and intentions of the FBI. Active work is being done questioning
potential witnesses who are mostly computer specialists in the Clinton private
circle. They represent the only tools which may be used in this matter.
Therefore, this threat is minimal.

DNC predicts a certain Clinton victory in the current presidential campaign. The
impressive results of Donald Trump are dividing the Republican Party (RP) elite,
which find itself “in a near-panic condition.”

A two-prong DP opposition is focused on discrediting Trump through debates and
propaganda activities based upon his weak points, such as his uncontrollable
temperament, questionable instances in business dealings, absence of diplomatic
skills, lack of political experience.

Among other things, the Clinton staff, with support from special services, is
preparing scandalous revelations of business relations between Trump and the
“Russian Mafia.” Currently, they are studying his connections with Aras Agalarov-
(owner of a group of companies, “Krokus Grupp”), Timur Sapir (a deceased
businessman of Russian heritage, suspected to have had ties to the Italian Mafia),
Tevfik Arif (owner of Bay Rock Group, suspected of being involved in
prostitution and “human trafficking,” from the former USSR), and Telman

Ismailov (AST Grupp). '!

'' (U) Classified Appendix Document-2; cf. OIG Review of 2016 Election Actions, Appendix One
at 6-7.

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Be regard to the discussion in the last paragraph of this
memorandum of “scandalous revelations” that the “Clinton staff” was preparing with support

from “special services,” the words that FBI linguists translated as “special services” are Russian
words that one analyst believed at the time referred to the FBI and the CIA or more broadly to
the intelligence and law enforcement communities.'? Another analyst, caveating it that it was
speculation, said that perhaps the phrase “special services” in this context could refer to Trump
dossier author Christopher Steele, ° who, according to media reports and Steele’s own testimony
in UK legal proceedings, formerly worked as an intelligence professional for the British
government. * In addition, the Office has determined that, at the time of this memorandum,
Glenn Simpson’s firm, Fusion GPS, was in fact preparing open source o iti searc|

>

regarding Trump’s

Fee E March 31, 2016, FBI personnel, including Deputy Director
McCabe, Deputy General Counsel Anderson, Assistant Director for the Cyber Division James
Trainor, and the Director’s Chief of Staff James Rybicki, shared the intelligence information
with Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis, the highest-ranking carecr official in
the Department, and other senior career officials at the Department. '° The FBI briefed Margolis
on the specifics of the Sensitive Intelligence and informed him that the FBI assessed the
information to likely not be credible.'? The FBI’s assessment, according to McCabe and later
memorialized by Anderson in an August 12, 2016 memorandum (discussed below), was based
on four factors. First, the reports reflected multiple levels of hearsay. Second, someone

involved in the communication, or in passing along the communicati ne at a think
tank, may have engaged in exaggeration. Third. =e drafted the

'2 (U) OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Analyst-2 on Feb. 25, 2020 at 5.
“ (U) OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Analyst-3 on Dec. 10, 2019 at 4.

'4 (U) Deborah Haynes, Christopher Steele. Confessions of a Former British Spy on Johnson,
Putin, Trump, and James Bond (Sky News Oct. 24, 2021); Trial Testimony of Christopher
Steele, Peter Aven, et al. v. Orbis Bus. Intel. Ltd., Claim No. HQI8M01646 (Mar. 17, 2020) at
147-48.

'S (U) See Nellie Ohr, Report of 4 March 2016 with Notes March 5.
© (U) OIG Review of 2016 Election Actions, Appendix One at 8-10.
17 (U) OSC Report of Interview of Trisha Anderson on May 26, 2021 at 5.

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reports may have engaged in editorialization or exaggeration. Fourth, the reports may be
unreliable because of translation errors. '8

ee that meeting, the F 5 N any
additional related information from T1.'9 T1 had no responsive information.” At this time, the

FBI considered taking a number of covert investigative steps to determine, among other things,
whether the Attorney General had in fact communicated with Am Renteria, the “political
director of the Hillary Clinton staff? referenced in the emorandum.*! The FBI
ultimately decided not to take these steps.?? Comey told the OIG that the FBI did not pursue
these steps because the information is was not credible on its face.? In this
regard, Trisha Anderson told investigators that the Director had said the assertion that the
Attorney General was pressuring him in connection with the Midyear Exam investigation gave
him doubts about the credibility of the two documents.24 He also understood that Margolis’s
view was that pursuing such steps would “take us down the path [where] we’re investigating the
Attorney General of the United States” and that Margolis thought that “you ought to have more
of a reason to go forward with it than what you have.”

The Ss receive additional information from TI

regarding a possible Clinton campaign plan

After receiving the initial intelligence in
iti i i rom T!. In particular, in
ized

enardo of the Open Society Foundations. ?6

E- from Tri to Midyear Exam case file, Re:

!? (U) OIG Review of 2016 Election Actions, Appendix One at 10.

2 (U) Ja.

2! (U) dd. at 10-11.

22 (U) Jd. at 11.

3 (U) Id.

= SC Report of Interview of Trisha Anderson on May 26, 2021 at 4; but
of eport of Interview of James Baker on June 8, 2021 at 3 (Baker did “not necessarily
agree” with the view that “the two reports were likely not credible”).

25 (U) OIG Review of 2016 Election Actions, Appendix One at 11. Regrettably, Mr. Margolis
passed away on July 14, 2016

26 (U) OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-2 on July 8, 2020 at 6-8; OSC Report of Interview
of Headquarters Analyst-3 on December 10, 2019 at 1, 4.

A x

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E- stated that Clinton approved a plan proposed by one of her foreign
policy advisors, Julianne Smith,?” to “smear Donald Trump by magnifying the scandal tied to the
intrusion by the Russian special services in the pre-election process to benefit the Republican
candidate.” The translated draft memorandum stated, in relevant part:

According to data from the election campaign headquarters of Hillary Clinton,
obtained via the U.S. Soros Foundation, on 26 July 2016, Clinton approved a plan
of her policy advisor, Juliana Smith” from the Ts. NAB [TN: unknown
acronym]? to smear Donald Trump by magnifying the scandal tied to the
intrusion by the Russian special services in the pre-election process to benefit the
Republican candidate.

As envisioned by Smith, raising the theme of “Putin’s support for Trump” to the
level of the Olympics scandal would divert the constituents’ attention from the
investigation of Clinton’s compromised electronic correspondence. In addition,
by subsequently steering public opinion toward the notion that it needs to equate
“Putin’s efforts” to influence political processes in the U.S. via cyberspace to acts
against a crucially important infrastructure (resembling a national power supply
network) would force the White House to use more confrontational scenarios vis-
a-vis Moscow that, as a whole, suits Clinton’s line of conduct. A relatively
“sluggish” reaction by the administration to the events surrounding the DNC, that
led to the resignation of Chairman Deborah Wasserman-Schultz provoked
exasperation within the PC [TN: Possibly, Political Convention] and the entire
Deep State, which may also be used by Clinton to reinforce her position among
the security-service agents.

Clinton’s supporters in the FBI lack conclusive irrefutable evidence of the
Russian Federation’s involvement in the scandal, tied to the theft of the DNC’s
correspondence. In the meantime, during the launched investigation, there has
been a multitude of circumstantial evidence that the alias of Guccifer 2.0 (the
name of the hacker who accepted responsibility for the incident) was, in fact, used

g w N the time, Smith worked at the Center for New American Security (“CNAS”)
and was serving as a Clinton campaign foreign policy advisor. OSC Report of Interview of
Julianne Smith on July 21, 2021 at 1. She advised investigators that she never received
notification that her account was hacked, but was aware that CNAS was “regularly challenged by

‘friends’ in China and Russia.” Id. at 8.

28 ae In context, it WN o E incorrectly referred to
Julianne Smith as “Juliana Smith.”

2? ~ OON “TN:” is a reference to a translator’s note.

ant

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to cover up a special unit of the GRU [TN: Genera! Staff Main Intelligence
Directorate] of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry’s General Staff.

During the first stage of the campaign, due to lack of direct evidence, it was
decided to disseminate the necessary information through the FBI-affiliated
“attic-based” technical structures that are involved in cyber security, in particular,
the Crowdstrike and ThreatConnect Companies, from where the information
would then be disseminated through leading US publications. In addition, it is
presumed in the FBI that in the future, any clumsy propaganda campaign by the
GRU is bound to lead to the emergence of more reliable indications of Moscow’s
involvement, which would imminently intensify the US confrontational
tendencies toward Russia.2°

ined a purported email
appears to have been

3 (U) Classified Appendix Document-3.

31 (U) OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-2 on July 8, 2020 at 7; OSC Report of Interview of
IC Officer-3 on July 8, 2020 at 3.

32 (U) OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Analyst-3 on December 10, 2019 at 1.

33 (U) Id
* (U) Classified Appendix Document-4.

KKK nee

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partially based. Notably, therein ¢ the document, which contained the

following text:
From: Leonard Benardo
Sent: July 25, 2016
Hi,
The media analysis on the DNC hacking appears solid. This is an important story

because it would be the first time (that we know of) that a state deliberately uses
the infiltration and publication of data to interfere in the US election.

At the same, politicization is on the table. I have been a bit surprised that nobody
has mentioned this 18-month-long story yet in their analysis, and makes explicit
reference to US elections at the end.

Julie? says it will be a long-term affair to demonize Putin and Trump. Now it is
good for a post-convention bounce. Later the FBI will put more oil into the fire.
Outcome is far from clear as Americans are more keen on their own woes and
Hillary is hardly good-looking as far as credibility is concerned. Anyway things
are ghastly for US-Russian relations.

Lenny*®

a a received from T1 a slightly different version of this
email. This version includes the statement that “later the FBI will put more oil into the fire” and
contains an added sentence:

From: Leonard Benardo

Sent: July 25, 2016

Hi,

The media analysis on the DNC hacking appears solid. This is an important story

because it would be the first time (that we know of) that a state deliberately uses
the infiltration and publication of data to interfere in the US election.

= his appears to be a reference to the Clinton foreign policy advisor
referenced in the memorandum, Julianne Smith.

3 (U) See Classified Appendix Document-S: Classified Appendix Document-6.

iO

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

At the same, politicization is on the table. I have been a bit surprised that nobody
has mentioned this 18-month-long story yet in their analysis, and makes explicit
reference to US elections at the end.

Julie says it will be a long-term affair to demonize Putin and Trump. Now it is
good for a post-convention bounce. Later the FBI will put more oil into the fire.
Outcome is far from clear as Americans are more keen on their own woes and
Hillary is hardly good-looking as far as credibility is concerned. Anyway it should
last as long as the Olympics accusations. And things are ghastly for US-Russian
relations.

Lenny”

Intelligen

all 1s as Tollows:

Great! A whole bunch of material appeared in the press today regarding this
subject. It appears that the noose around Guccifer’s Russian background is
tightening. | suggest doing [TN: writing] something about a task from someone, |
don’t know, some dark forces, like the FBI for instance, or better yet, Clinton
sympathizers in IC, Pentagon, Deep State (or somewhere else?), about American
websites deploying a campaign to demonize the actions of Russia’s GRU, acting
in accordance to orders by VVP [TN: Vladimir Putin], to undermine the forces of
good in the elections in the interest of Donald Trump, who is basically an agent of
influence. Using inept GRU operatives (there is such information) and their
general inclination to adventurism and idiocy, a number of crucial technical
indications pointing to Russia were exposed. And so on. Will that be okay??8

a ~~ Ga
, appears to discuss “mak[ing]

"CE «30-2 Appendix Document-4 (italics added to show difference from
other version of email) (emphasis added).

38 (U) Classified Appendix Document-7.
? (U) Classified Appendix Document-6.

s10

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= The email attached the following English text in a document, which appears to be
another email from Benardo, bearing a date of July 27th:
From: Leonard Benardo
Sent: July 27, 2016
Hi,
HRC approved Julia’s idea about Trump and Russian hackers hampering U.S.
elections. That should distract people from her own missing email, especially if
the affair goes to the Olympic level. The point is making the Russian play a U.S.
domestic issue. Say something like a critical infrastructure threat for the election
to feel menace since both POTUS and VPOTUS have acknowledged the fact IC
would spced up searching for evidence that is regrettably still unavailable.
However there seems to be signs GRU penetration (cyrlic, 2.0 VPN elite VPN,
Felix Edmundovich). They appear hardly skilled, “incompetent bumbling idiots”
as smb [somebody] called them. In absence of direct evidence, Crowdstrike and
ThreatConnect will supply the media, and GRU will hopefully carry on to give
more facts.*!

ee The authenticity of the Benardo emails
ee Office interviewed numerous F Bt EB persone
who were involved tn Crossfire Hurricane (or related intelligence efforts) to determine whether

they could shed light on the potential reliability or unreliability of the information about the
possible Clinton campaign plan. Certain analysts and officers whom the Office

interviewed, and who were well-versed in the Sensitive Intelligence collection, stated that their

best assessment was that the Benardo emails were likel authentic.*? Multiple anal t
that the j in fact, hacked Benardo’s =a
3 Some analysts also noted it was possible, however, that the

*° (U) Classified Appendix Document-8.
+ (U) Zd.
42 (U) See, e.g., OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-2 on July 8, 2020 at 4, 7; OSC Report of

Interview of IC Officer-14 on May 19, 2021 at 4; OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters
Analyst-2 on Feb.25, 2020 at 12.

#3 (U) See, e.g., OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-2 on July 8, 2020 at 4; OSC Report of
Interview of IC Officer-3 on July 8, 2020 at 4; OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-14 on

May 19, 2021 at 2.

STe

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rted U.S. emails.* But some of these an:

Russians might have fabricated or altered pu
also noted that the Sensiti j

— F addition, the Office obtained records from a number of non-
profit organizations and think tanks (that, as noted above, were the victims of hacks by Russian
intelligence) to determine the accuracy of the Sensitive Intelligence and whether it in fact
reflected an actual plan by the Clinton campaign. These included, among others, the Open
Society Foundations, the Atlantic Council, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

(“Carnegie Endowment”), and the Center for a New American Security (collectively, the “Think
Tanks”).

EO o ....:.. the Office was unable to locate in the records from the
Think Tanks any exact versions of the Benardo emails obtained through from T1. The Office
did, however, identify certain emails, attachments, and documents that contain language and
references with the exact same or similar verbiage to the materials referenced above. For
instance, on July 25, 2016 — the same date as one of the emails purportedly from Benardo — Tim
Maurer, a Carnegie Endowment cyber expert, replied to an email asking for Maurer’s opinion on
an article titled, “The Hacks We Can't See: All Signs Point to Russia Being Behind the DNC
Hack.”*® Maurer began by stating that “[the author] is very good, thoughtful[.]” Maurer then
wrote the following, which contains certain language that also appears verbatim in the email

attributed to Benardo of the same date:

[H]is analysis is solid. Regarding the DNC story, I agree with Rid that this is an
important story because it would be the first time (that we know of) that a state
deliberately uses the exfiltration and publication of data to interfere in another
country’s election.

At the same time, I have been a bit surprised that nobody has mentioned this
March story yet in their analysis (which makes explicit reference to US elections

“4 (U) See, e.g., OSC Report of Interview of i eEmployee-4 on Feb. 27, 2020 at 12-13; OSC
Report of Interview of IC Officer-2 on July 8, 2020 at 8; OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-
6 on Aug. 19, 2020 at 7; OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-10 on Oct. 7, 2020 at 2-3; OSC
Report of Interview of Headquarters Analyst-2 on Feb. 25, 2020 at 5-6.

* (U) See, e.g., OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-3 on July 8, 2020 at 5-6.

* (U) Classified Appendix Document-9; Thomas Rid, All Signs Point to Russia Being Behind the
DNC Hack, Vice (July 25, 2016).

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

at the end): http://www/bloomberg.com/features/2016-how-to-hack-an- .
election/.*”

eee addition to this email from Maurer, the think-tank records
also contained a July 27, 2016 email from Julianne Smith, the Clinton campaign advisor, in
which Smith circulated a draft public statement to certain of her think-tank colleagues. In the
email — which Smith sent the day after Clinton purportedly authorized the above-referenced plan
— Smith urged her colleagues to sign the draft statement that criticized Trump for his comments
about the NATO alliance and asserted that Trump’s public statements concerning NATO were

too friendly towards Russia. In her cover email, Smith wrote, in part:

We are writing to enlist your support for the attached public statement. Both of us
are Hillary Clinton supporters and advisors but hope that this statement could be
signed by a bipartisan group[.] Donald Trump’s repeated denigration of the
NATO Alliance, his refusal to support our Article 5 obligations to our European
allies and his kid glove treatment of Russia and Vladimir Putin are among the
most reckless statements made by a Presidential candidate in memory.“*

(U) During the same week, Clinton’s campaign manager, Robby Mook, stated in media
interviews that the campaign believed that the Russian government had carried out the DNC
hack to assist Trump’s electoral chances, and that Trump had made troubling statements

concerning Russia.*?

aes noted above, the Office conducted multiple interviews related
to the Sensitive Intelligence, including interviews of Leonard Benardo, Tim Maurer, and
Julianne Smith.°° When Benardo was shown redacted versions of the purported emails from the
Sensitive Intelligence, Benardo stated that they did not look familiar to him, and that he would

‘a... Appendix Document-9 (italics added to show difference from
other version of email). The article found at the hyperlink above describes the activities of a
South America-based political consultant who provides services to electoral campaigns that
involve hacking of political opponents.

“8 (U) Classified Appendix Document-9.

* (U) Jeremy Herb, Mook Suggests Russians Leaked DNC Emails to Help Trump, POLITICO
(July 24, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/201 6/07/robby-mook-russians-emails-trump-

226084; Jessie Heuman, Clinton Campaign Manager Questions Russian Involvement in Email
Leak, The Hill (July 24, 2016), https://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/288998-

clinton-campaign-manager-dnc-to-get-to-bottom-off.

50 a Benardo does not possess a security clearance, the Office
received one-time authorization from to show Benardo these materials without
disclosing to him how they were obtained. Benardo signed a proffer agreement in which he
agreed not to share materials shown to him during the interview with third parties.

«43.

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not have used certain terms, such as “oil into the fire.”5! Benardo also did not know who “Julie”
referred to in the July 25, 2016 purported emails.* Benardo stated that, to the best of his
recollection, he did not draft the emails.’ Benardo stated, however, that the last sentence in the
email — noting that “things are ghastly for US-Russian relations” — sounded like something he

would have said.’

o o oe an interview with the Office, Maurer likewise was shown the
purported emails from Benardo. Maurer stated that he did not write either email. He
acknowledged, however, writing the above-referenced July 25, 2016 email identified in the
Carnegie Endowment’s production. He also acknowledged that portions of the language in the

July 25, 2016 email obtained through the T1 collection — and purported to be from Benardo —
were identical to language in Maurer’s email of the same date to his colleagues.

es the Office interviewed Julianne Smith.’ Smith stated that
she neither drafted nor recalled receiving either of the purported Benardo emails.°° Smith stated
that she did not specifically remember proposing a plan to Clinton or other campaign leadership
to try to tie Trump to Putin or Russia.’ Smith stated, however, that it was possible that she had
proposed ideas on these topics to the campaign’s leadership, who may have approved those
ideas. Smith recalled conversations with others in the campaign expressing their genuine
concerns that the DNC hack was a threat to the electoral system, and that Trump and his advisors
appeared to have troubling ties to Russia.’ Smith said it was also possible someone proposed an
idea of seeking to distract attention from the investigation into Secretary Clinton’s use of a
private email server, but she did not specifically remember any such idea. Smith said, however,
that she was certain any proposal she made to the Clinton campaign seeking to highlight issues

too g Report of Interview of Leonard Benardo on May 21, 2021 at 3.

52 (U) Id.

53 U) Id.

54 (U) Ja.

S (UBB osc interview of Julianne Smith on July 21, 2021.

= ec | Íd. at 7 (Smith maintains an active Top Secret security clearance.)

” (U) Id.

58 (U) Id
9 (U) id.
8 (U) Zad.

ota.

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

concerning Trump and Russia would not have included an effort to enlist the FBI in furtherance
of those efforts.°!

Bee. addition, the Office interviewed Clinton herself and several
former members of the Clinton campaign using the Sensitive Intelligence materials declassified
by the DNI regarding the purported “plan” approved by Clinton. In reviewing the July 2016
declassified Sensitive Intelligence material, Clinton stated that it “looked like Russian
disinformation to [her].”°* Campaign Chair John Podesta stated that he had not seen the
declassified materials before, characterized the information as “ridiculous,” and denied that the
campaign was involved in any such “plan.”© Senior Policy Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that he
had not seen the declassified memorandum before and had no reaction to it other than to say,
“that’s ridiculous.”* Although admitting that the campaign was broadly focused on Trump and
Russia, Sullivan could not recall anyone articulating a strategy or “plan” to distract negative
attention away from Clinton by tying Trump to Russia, but could not conclusively rule out the
possibility. Communications Director Jennifer Palmieri stated that she had never seen the
memorandum before, found its contents to be “ridiculous,” and could not recall! anything “like
this” related to the campaign. Palmieri stated that Podesta, Sullivan, Mook, and herself were
aware of a project involving ties between Trump and Russia being conducted by Perkins Coie,
but Palmieri did not think that Clinton was aware of it, nor did Palmieri receive any direction or
instruction from her about it.6” Foreign Policy Advisor-2 confirmed that the campaign was
focused on Trump and Russia, but that focus was due to national security concerns and not
designed to distract the public from Clinton’s server issue. 6 F oreign Policy Advisor-2 stated
that she did not have a conversation with Clinton about a plan involving Trump and Russia
during the Democratic Convention, that she did not remember Clinton approving anything
concrete, but that Foreign Policy Advisor-2 would not necessarily have been involved in such

strategy conversations. 6’

eee ee Office’s review of certain communications involving Smith
provided possible additional support, however, to the notion that the Clinton campaign was

engaged in an effort or plan in late July 2016 to encourage scrutiny of Trump’s purported ties to

61 (U) Ia.
62? (U) OSC Report of Interview of Hillary Clinton on May 11, 2022 at 6.

63 (U) OSC Report of Interview of John Podesta on Jan. 19, 2022 at 5.

& (U) OSC Report of Interview of Jake Sullivan on Nov. 1 1, 2021 at 3-4.

65 (U) Id.

& (U) OSC Report of Interview of Jennifer Palmieri on Nov. 10, 2021 at 4.

67 (U) Id. at 1-2

68 (U) OSC Report of Interview of Foreign Policy Advisor-2 on Mar. 28, 2022 at 4.

© (U) Id.

oe

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

Russia, and that the campaign might have wanted or expected the FBI or other agencies to aid
that effort (“put more oil into the fire”) by commencing a formal investigation of the DNC hack.
ae: example, on July 5, 2016, Foreign Policy Advisor-2 emailed campaign

advisors Smith, Clinton Campaign Advisor-1 and Clinton Campaign Advisor-2 in which she
wrote:

We're looking for ways to build on Franklin Foer’s great (and scary)

piece on Trump and Russia. One thing I’ve heard from a few folks is that

the Russia desk at State has been tracking (and sounding an internal

alarm) about parallels between rhetoric/words/methods that Trump uses

and Putin-supported European right-wing candidates. I’m told it goes

beyond just populist stuff. I’d love to get my hands on details of what

they are seeing - can one of you help run this down? I imagine [NR or IC

types might also have some insight - obviously need to be a bit careful

here but eager to get specifics or details.”
Foreign Policy Advisor-2 stated that she did not speak with anyone at the State Department
about this issue.”! The information she mentioned in this email regarding the State Department's
Russia Desk came from Outside Advisor-1.72

| In addition, on July 25, 2016 — the same day as the purported
email from Benardo stating that “Julie says it will be a long-term affair to demonize Putin and
Trump” and “[l]ater the FBI will put more oil into the fire” — Smith had the following text
message exchange with Foreign Policy Advisor-2:

From: Foreign Policy Advisor-2
Sent Time: 7/25/2016 11:00 AM

Can you see if [Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council
member] will tell you if there is a formal fbi or other investigation into the hack?

From: Julianne Smith
Sent Time: 7/25/2016 11:01 AM
She won’t say anything more to me. Sorry. Told me she went as far as she could.

From: Foreign Policy Advisor-2
Sent Time: 7/25/2016 11:02 AM

1 (U) Id. at 5.
7 (U) Ia.
7? (U) Id.

= 2

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

Ok. Do you have others who might?

From: Julianne Smith
Sent Time: 7/25/2016 11:03 AM

Has [Clinton Campaign Advisor-1] tried her? Curious if she would react
differently to him? I can also try OVP [Office of the Vice President]. They might
say more.

From: Foreign Policy Advisor-2
Sent Time: 7/25/2016 11:05 AM

I don’t know if he has but can ask. Would also be good to try ovp, and anyone in
IC [intelligence community]

From: Julianne Smith
Sent Time: 7/25/2016 11:32 AM

Left messages for OVP but politico just sent me a push notification stating that
they are indeed investigating.

From: [telephone number] Foreign Policy Advisor-2

Sent Time: 7/25/2016 11:35 AM

Fbi just put our [sic] statement. Thx”?

ie: Office’s best assessment is that the July 25th and July 27th
emails purport to om Benardo were ultimately a composite of several emails that were
obtained through Russian intelligence hacking of the U.S.-based Think Tanks, including the
Open Society Foundations, the Carnegie Endowment, and others, Indeed, as discussed above,
language from Tim Maurer’s email of July 25th is identical to language contained in Benardo’s
purported email of the same date. Furthermore, given Smith’s (i) extensive contacts in the think-

tank community, (ii) her public role as a foreign policy advisor for the Clinton campaign, and

(iii) her co apk colleagues regarding Trump, it is a logical deduction
ees 9 was, at a minimum, playing a role in the Clinton
campaign's efforts to tle [rump to Russia. Indeed, Smith’s July 27th email to her think-tank

colleagues regarding Trump, Russia and NATO -the day after candidate Clinton allegedly
approved a plan to tie Trump to Russia — certainly lends at least some credence that such a plan
existed. Moreover, Smith’s text message exchange with Foreign Policy Advisor-2 supports.the

® (U) Id. at 14-15.

s TFs

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

notion that the campaign might have wanted or expected the FBI or other agencies to aid that
effort (“put more oil into the fire”) by commencing a formal investigation of the DNC hack.

© We response by the FBI and U.S. intelligence agencies to the Sensitive
Intelligence

In the days and weeks following receipt of the Sensitive
Intelligence from T1, multiple high-ranking U.S. officials received reports and briefings
conveying or summarizing, among other information, the intelligence concerning the purported
plan by the Clinton campaign. For instance, on August 3, 2016, during a meeting at the White
House, CIA Director Brennan briefed President Obama, Vice President Biden, DNI Clapper, FBI
Director Comey, and other U.S. officials regarding Russian interference efforts as well as the T1
intelligence received concerning the referenced plan by the Clinton campaign.” Brennan’s
handwritten notes stated, in part, “We’re getting additional insight into Russian activities [that]
cite alleged approval by Hillary Clinton on 26 July of a proposed plan from one of her foreign
policy advisors to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming Russian interference by
the Russian security services.””

(U) In addition, as described in the unclassified report, on September 7, 2016, the CIA
sent the FBI an “investigative referral” memorandum that referred to, among other information,
the purported Clinton campaign plan.

received the

IA prepared a written
e authenticity and veracity of the above-referenced intelligence. The CIA stated

74 (U) Notes of John O. Brennan, declassified by DNI Ratcliffe Oct. 6, 2020 (hereinafter
“Brennan Notes’’); Classified Appendix Document-10.

15 (U) See Letter from John Ratcliffe, DNI, to Sen. Lindsey Graham (Sept. 29, 2020) (hereinafter
“Ratcliffe Letter).

So

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

that it did not assess that the cbove II sc rsorancs, az
hacked U.S. communications, to be the product of Russian fabrications.

GB 4 pproximately four years later, in September 2020, the DNI declassified certain
information related to the Sensitive Intelligence. In a letter to Senator Lindsay Graham, the DNI
declassified, among other things, that:

In late July 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies obtained insight into Russian
intelligence analysis alleging that U.S. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had
approved a campaign plan to stir up a scandal against U.S. Presidential candidate
Donald Trump by tying him to Putin and the Russians’ hacking of the Democratic
National Committee. The IC does not know the accuracy of this allegation or the
extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or
fabrication.’

The DNI also declassified a portion of former CIA Director Brennan’s handwritten notes that
describe the August 3, 2016 meeting with President Obama” and the CZA Referral Memorandum
sent to Director Comey and Deputy Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Peter Strzok.®

| ae FBI provides a defensive briefing to Attorney General Lynch

aa July 12, 2016, FBI personnel, including Deputy Director
McCabe and Deputy General Counsel Anderson, briefed Deputy Attorney General Yates and
others about the T1 information. While the consensus amongst the group was that the
information was not credible, the decision was ultimately made by Yates to brief Attorney
General Lynch on the T1 information. Then on August 10, 2016 fter receiving
the initial reports from T1, McCabe and Anderson provided a defensive briefing to Attorney
General Lynch regarding the T1 information. McCabe and Anderson gave the Attorney General
copies of the January and March 2016 reports to review. For unknown reasons, Lynch was not
shown the-July 25 and July 27 Benardo emails describing the “plan” by the Clinton campaign to
link Trump to Russia.. When interviewed by the Office, Anderson stated that to the best of her
recollection she never saw the Benardo emails, but noted that they would have been helpful for
her interview with Attorney General Lynch.®!

ae) to Anderson, Lynch denied knowing Renteri
Clinton campaign official) but did not deny or comment on the broader assertions i

77 (U) Classified Appendix Document-! 1.

78 (U) Ratcliffe Letter.

79 (U) Brennan Notes.

80 (U) CIA Referral dated Sept. 7, 2016.

8! (U) OSC Report of Interview of Trisha Anderson on May 26, 2021 at 7.

- 19-

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

eports concerning efforts to improperly influence the Department’s investigations. ®
According to McCabe in his interview with the OIG:

[S]he read eports} and I will probably never forget she just
finished reading them and said, okay . . . . I mean like I expected more of
a reaction than that. Like I expected like, this is crazy, I never talked to
that person. But she was absolutely stone faced and said nothing about
the content of the memos—which I don’t know how to interpret that.®3

McCabe added that he thought the Attorney General’s reaction to the substance of the reports
was “odd.”®+ Anderson similarly told the OIG that she found it a “little bit weird” that the
Attorney General did not affirmatively disavow the contents of eports, and that she
(Anderson) and McCabe had discussed the “circumspect” nature of her response.® In an
interview with the Office, Anderson described Attorney General Lynch as being “a little
surprised” at what she read, providing what Anderson noted as a “measured response.”
Anderson also stated that she (Anderson) was struck by the fact that the Attorney General
pronounced the name “Renteria” (the Clinton campaign official) in a peculiar fashion.
Additionally, Anderson recalled telling McCabe on the walk back to FBI headquarters that the
Attorney General’s response to the reports was “odd.” Anderson based this assessment on the
fact that the Attorney General did not seem visibly outraged, nor did she (the Attorney General)
denounce or object to the contents of the reports relating to her alleged contacts with the Clinton

campaign. °°

The OIG Appendix to the 2016 Election Actions report includes a
different reaction by the Attorney General than Anderson and McCabe’s version of their August
10, 2016 meeting with her. In the first instance, the Attorney General told the OIG that the FBI
did not show her the eports she was being asked to examine with the OIG
interviewers. Lynch believed that McCabe and Anderson showed her something more
abbreviated and told her up front that she was being provided a defensive briefing conceming a
collection of materials that were not deemed to have investigative value. She had the distinct
impression from McCabe that the reports were not credible and may in fact be fake.
Furthermore, the FBI informed Lynch that there were no plans to further investigate or pursue
the suggestions in the reports that she had been working with Renteria to influence the outcome
of the Midyear investigation. The Attorney General told the OIG that she emphatically told
‘McCabe and Anderson she never knew anyone named Amanda Renteria and that the FBI was
welcome to interview her and anyone on her staff. She also told the FBI there was no truth to the

82 (U) Id

83 (U) OIG Review of 2016 Election Actions, Appendix One at 13.

8 (U) Id. at 14.

85 (U) Id.

36 (U) OSC Report of Interview of Trisha Anderson on May 26, 2021 at 7.

ie

allegations in the reports and that she had never communicated with anyone on the Clinton
campaign team about the Midyear investigation.*” **

Loo Office has also interviewed FBI General Counsel Baker, to

whom Anderson reported at the time of the defensive briefing. Baker told the Office that, based
on reports he received of the defensive briefing, he was greatly concerned about Lynch’s
reaction.“ Moreover, Baker, unlike his FBI colleagues, did not dismiss the credibilit
eports.”° In fact, Baker informed the Office that following the defensive briefing of
Lynch, he began to have concerns about Lynch's potential bias due in part to her (i) curious

reaction to the Sensitive Intelligence information, (ii) interaction with former President Clinton

*” (U) See OIG Review of 2016 Election Actions, Appendix One at 14-16.

eee Report of Interview of James Baker an Feb. 7, 2020 at 10-11
(stating that “he and other FBI Executives had great concerns about Attorney General Lynch’s
reaction to a memorandum contained in the [Sensitive Intelligence] that alleged she was going to
use her position to make sure that Hillary Clinton was not prosecuted”); see also OSC Report of
Interview of James Baker on June 8, 2021 at 4 (noting that the Attorney General’s “reaction
upon learning of the allegations “smelled bad’”); OSC Report of Interview of James Baker on
June 18, 2020 at 6 (stating “how bothered he personally was” by the Attomey General’s
“response of ‘Thank You’ after being briefed about her alleged exchange of information with
Renteria”).

” (U) OSC Report of Interview of James Baker on June 8, 2021 at 3 (Although Baker saw
problems with the credibility of the reports, “he also believed that the reports should not have

been dismissed out of hand”).

oi PE

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on the tarmac in Phoenix, and (iii) guidance to Director Comey that the Clinton email
investigation should be referred to as a “matter.”?!

aos any event, on August 12, 2016, following the defensive
briefing of Lynch, Anderson drafted a memorandum summarizing communications between the

FBI and the Department and outlining the steps the FBI had taken with respect to the referenced
January and March reports collected from T1. As discussed above, in that memorandum,
Anderson outlined four reasons why the FBI assessed the information in the reports not to be
credible. First, the reports reflected multiple levels of hearsay. Second, there was the possibility
of exaggeration by someone involved in the communication, or in passi e
communication to someone at a think tank. Third ‘ho drafted
the reports may have engaged in editorialization or exaggeration. Fourth, there was the potential
for unreliability due to translation errors. The FBI’s assessment of the reports conflicts with that
of the CIA, which as noted above, assessed the information to not be the product of Russian
fabrication.”

oe a Sensitive Intelligence and Director Comey's announcement of the

Clinton email server investigation’ findings

a Comey subsequently testified before Congress that the
Sensitive Intelligence was among the reasons he decided to announce the conclusion of the FBI's
investigation of Clinton’s private email server in July 2016 without the participation or
awareness of the Attorney General or the Department.” According to Comey, although he
believed the assertions in memoranda concerning Lynch's behavior were not
consistent with his own interactions with the Attorney General, he was concerned that, if the
sensitive intelligence leaked, it could undermine the public’s perception of the Attorney
General’s impartiality and the integrity of the FBI’s investigation.”

In short, neither the Office nor
Clinton campaign pla
yas entirely genuine, partially true, a
composite pulled trom multiple sources, exaggerated in certain respects, or fabricated in its
entirety. Nonetheless, the late July 2016 Sensitive Intelligence, which a senior intelligence
official with significant and detailed knowledge of the Sensitive Intelligence collection described
as “really concerning,” immediately made its way to CIA Headquarters.” Director Brennan

9! (U) Id. at 4; OSC Report of Interview of James Baker on June 18, 2020 at 6.

* (U) Classified Appendix Document-11.

%3 (U) Testimony of James Comey at 70-71, HPSCI Russia Investigation (May 4, 2017).
) 8 y

% (U) Id. at 71; Testimony of James Comey at 61, SSCI (June 8, 2017); OIG Review of 2016
Election Actions, Appendix One at 16, 29.

5 (U) OSC Report of Interview of IC Officer-6 on Aug. 19, 2020 at 4.

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

similarly appears to have recognized the significance of the information as evidenced by his
briefing the President, Vice President, the Attorney General, the DNI, the Director of the FBI,
and other high-ranking government officials within a matter of days. Moreover, in early
September 2016, the CIA prepared a referral memorandum on the information regarding the
purported “plan” that went to the FBI, and the information was included in an Intelligence Note
prepared later in September 2016 related to Russian election interference. Thus, the record
reflects that the FBI was fully alerted to the possibility that at least some of the information it
was receiving about the Trump campaign might have its origin either with the Clinton campaign
or its supporters, or alternatively, was the product of Russian disinformation. Despite this
awareness, the FBI appears to have dismissed the T1 information as not credible without any
investigative steps actually having been taken to either corroborate or disprove the allegations.

(U) II. Section IV.B.1 — The threat of foreign election influence by Foreign
Government-2

EARE noted in the public report, in November 2014 the FBI received
information from a long-time Confidential Human Source (“CHS”) operated by Field Office-L.
The FBI also received corroborating information from two separate, authorized Forei
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) surveillance

One person (“Non-U.S. Person-1”) directly tasked by the leader of Foreign
Government-2 with helping to facilitate this plan resided overseas at the time, but had indicated
that he/she was planning to travel to the United States in late 2014.% Field Office-1 sought FISA
coverage of Non-U.S. Person-1, almost immediately, in order to obtain access to his/her email
accounts and to conduct a search of him/her as soon as he/she arrived in the United States.”
Although Field Office-1 attempted to obtain expedited approval for the FISA authorization,’
the certified copy of the application was sent by OI to the FBI Headquarters for final approval
where it remained “in limbo,” according to Field Office-1 SAC-1, for approximately four

% (U) Classified Appendix Document-12.

7 (U) FBI-AAA-03-0000482, Email from Field Office-1 SAC-1 to FBI Director James Comey,
April 14, 2015,

j BR 2-A- 12-0023529 (Codename-1 Investigation Chronology); see also
OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Supervisory Special Agent-4 dated May 28, 2020 at 6.
” (U) FBI-AAA-03-0000482 at 0000483, Email from Field Office-1 SAC-1 to FBI Director

James Comey, April 14, 2015.
10 (U) FBI-AAA-12-0023529 (Codename-1 Investigation Chronology).

BB

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

months.!?! According to another agent, the application lingered because “everyone was “super
more careful” and “scared with the big name [Clinton]” involved. “[T]hey were pretty
‘tippy-tocing” around HRC because there was a chance she would be the next President.” 1%
Similarly, Field Office-1 SAC-1 told investigators that, when she spoke with the
Counterintelligence Division Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director, they alluded to
the fact that they did not want a presidential candidate on tape, even though Field Office-1 SAC-
| believed that was a very remote possibility.” According to the records the Office reviewed. it
appears that the delay also may have been partially attributable to a decision to await the
confirmation of the incoming Attorney General. !°5

Ithough Non-U.S. Person-1's travel to the United States was postponed,
the Department eventually decided that it would authorize seeking FISA authority, but only after
there was a commitment that Clinton and others who were being targeted by Foreign
Govermment-2 would receive defensive briefings.' As noted in the public report, these
briefings were given, but it took approximately 11 months from the time of the receipt of the
original allegations.

10! (U) FBI-AAA-03-0000482 at 0000483, Email from Field Office-1 SAC-1 to FBI Director
James Comey, April 14, 2015.

102 (U) OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Supervisory Special Agent-4 dated May 28,
2020 at 8.

103 (U) OSC Report of Interview of Headquarters Supervisory Special Agent-4 dated May 28,
2020 at 9.

o osc report of interview of Field Office-1 SAC dated Sept. 10, 2020 at 1.

OSC Report of Interview of Field Office-1 SAC dated Sept. 10, 2020 at 3.

e I = 1-A 4 4- 12-0023529 at 31 (Codename-1 Investigation Chronology).

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

ons

(U) II. Section IV.D.1.a.ii— Assessment in the FISA renewal application:
regarding Carter Page’s July 2016 Moscow trip and purported meetings with
Igor Sechin and Igor Divyekin

As set out in the unclassified report, the leadership of the FBI directed that Page
not be interviewed at the time that he (Page) sent a letter to Director Comey volunteering to be
interviewed, and in fact no interview of Page was approved by Director Comey until March
2017."'' Page then voluntarily had not one, but five, interviews. The relevant FBI FD-302
interview reports do not indicate that Page was ever asked about the above-referenced email sent
to the campaign in July 2016, and the FBI’s reasoning for not asking is unclear. Put another
way, despite the fact that the email — and the FBI’s assessment of its import — were included in

$e
07 (U) SSCI Russia Report, pt. 5, at 549.

108 (U) Jd.
0° (U) See In re Carter W. Page, Order No. 17-52 at 31-32 (FISC Jan. 12, 2017) (renewal

application) (nonpublic version); Jn re Carter W. Page, Order No. 16-1182 at 15-18 (FISC Oct.
21, 2016) (initiation mentioning meetings with Sechin and Divyekin) (publicly released version),

110 (U) See In re Carter W. Page, Order No. 17-52 at 31-32 (nonpublic version).

| i. Lync Message exchanges of 10/13/2016 and 3/8/2017 among Case Agent-1,
Special Agent-2, Special Agent-3, Supervisory Special Agent-1, Supervisory Special Agent-3,
Chicago Agent-1, and Support Operations Specialist-1 as referenced in the unclassified report in
Section IV.D.h.ii. .

'!2 (U) The Crossfire Hurricane investigators interviewed Page on March 9. 10, 16, 30, and 31,
2017.

atts.

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

(U) In November 2017, however, Page’s email to campaign officials was explored by
Congressman Adam Schiff during Page's testimony before the House Permanent Select
Committec on Intelligence (“HPSCI"). In his testimony, Page confirmed to Schiff that he had
sent the email in question, which led to Schit? inquiring:

Mr. Schiff: “Dr. Page, Mr. Steele in the dossier makes reference to a meeting that you

had with a representative of the Presidential administration. Did you meet with any

representatives of the Presidential administration while you were in Moscow in July of
last year?”

Mr. Page: “Just that brief greeting I mentioned.”

Mr. Schiff: “So the only person you met - you only met with a single person from the
Presidential administration and that was Dvorkovich?”

Mr. Page: “Yes sir, again, being very careful of the distinction between met and meeting,
yes.”
Mr. Schiff: “ .. . on July 8, of last year, you wrote in an email to the campaign that you

had incredible insights and outreach that you received from Russian legislators and senior
members, plural, of the Presidential administration .. zar

Mr. Page: “There has been - again, great feedback and positive feelings were expressed in
public forums and just reading the newspaper in Russian that there was hope for the
future. . , 113

Later, Schiff inquired as follows:

Mr. Schiff: “Dr. Page, I’m referring to Bates stamp [redacted] in which you relate that
you had received insights and outreach from Russian legislators and senior members of
the Presidential administration. What members of the Presidential administration did you

meet?”

Mr. Page: “No meetings. You know, it’s insights versus outreach. The insights were
primarily based on the materials or the ideas that I read in the press, similar to my
listening to President Trump in the various speeches that I heard of his.”!'*

Finally, Schiff ended by Stating:

Mr. Schiff: “ . . . [aJnd what you have related privately to the Trump campaign, that you
had met with Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential administration.”

ee ES
(U) HPSCI, Testimony of Carter Page at 40-41 (Nov. 2, 2017), https://
intelligence.house.gov/ uploadedfiles/carter_page_hpsci_hearing_transcript_nov 2 20 17.pdf.

"14 (U) dd. at 41.

~ 96%

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

Mr. Page: “I do not see the word ‘meeting’ in this sentence, Congressman Schiff. Again,
outreach is available, and incredible insights were provided .. , .”"!5

As the transcript of the hearing reflects, Page was correct in his assertion that his email did not
reference or mention any meetings with any Russian officials.

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”) also discussed this email and
Page’s July 2016 trip to Moscow in its report.''® The report described Page's testimony
regarding the email, noting that he had difficulty recalling the alleged high-level engagements he
referenced in it.''? Page also testified that the “incredible insights and outreach” mentioned in
the email were “the exchange with academics over dinner on July 5; one encounter he had with a
staff member who worked for a Duma (Russian parliament) member and whose name he could
not recall; and, the handshake with [Deputy Prime Minister] Dvorkovich at the New Economic
School commencement ceremony.”!!8 Page also told the Committee that “the unnamed staffer
and Dvorkovich were the only two people that he directly interacted with in the Russian
government during the trip.”!!9

Page’s congressional testimony was consistent with his public statements to the
media; statements he made to CHS-1 in the conversations CHS-1 recorded; and statements he
made to the FBI during his interviews in March 20| 7. Yet the FBI “assessed” in both the April
2017 and June 2017 FISA renewal applications that the email Page sent to campaign officials
was evidence of Page having met Russian government officials, including legislators and
members of the Presidential administration and, in particular, Sechin and Divyeckin. Ata
minimum, the various statements of Page, including perhaps most particularly the recorded
Statement with CHS-1, should have been brought to the attention of OI and the FISC in a more

fulsome way. '

=L
''S (U) Id. at 42,

116 (U) See SSCI Russia Report, pt. 5, at 548-550.
''7 (U) id. at 549-550.
''8 (U) Jd. at 550.

PTD) Id

'20 (U) See In re Carter W. Page, Order No. 17-3 75, at 32 (FISC April 7, 2017) (publicly

released version) (informing the FISC that “Page publicly, and in interviews with the F BI, has
denied meeting with Sechin and Divyekin during his July 2016 trip to Moscow”); In re Carter
W. Page, Order No. 17-679, at 35-36 (FISC June 29, 2017) (publicly released version) (same).

=F

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transcript of the meeting that was prepared months later by the FBI, !2! Thus, the Crossfire
Hurricane investigators either reviewed the recording and failed to report the erroneous reporting
to OI and the FISC, or they never took the time to review the materials, 22 In either case, the
FISC was not apprised of information that could have cast doubt on the reliability of CHS-1’s
information.” In addition, OI was not apprised of the doubts some of the Crossfire Hurricane
investigators had about the CHS’s claim or of the possibility that Sechin would have had no
interest in meeting with Page at that time. '24

meanest
2 TO to FBI records, the transcript was completed on April 25, 2017 and a
corrected copy done on or about May 2, 2017. FBI-AAA-KC-0024034- 1; FBI-AAA-KC-
0024035-1.

'22 (U) As noted in Section IV.D.1.h.vi of the unclassified report, no records were provided to the
Office that showed that the recording had been reviewed by Crossfire Hurricane investigators or
its contents shared with the Department lawyers working on the Page FISA applications. In
addition, the FBI’s Inspection Division found that the recording was not reviewed and the
investigating agents simply relied on the CHS's erroneous report of the conversation. See FBI
Inspection Division Report at 217.

123 (U) See Section IV.D.1.h.vii of the unclassified report.

124 (U) Lync Message exchange between Supervisory Special Agent-1 and Case Agent-I on
12/21/2016 and 12/22/2016:

Case Agent-1: “CHS reached out to me today, remembered that [Page] told
[CHS-1] that he met with Sechin this past trip.” Supervisory Special Agent-1:
“Come on.” Case Agent-1: “yup, said [CHS-1] just remembered it yesterday after
reading Sechin’s name in the paper.” Supervisory Special Agent-1: “We need
that audio then.”

Lync Exchange between Case Agent-1 and Analyst-1 on 12/23/2016:

Analyst-1: “man, yeah, I just don’t get him [referring to Page] or Cohen at all man
... it’s like they are living in a dream world . . . that would be pretty interesting if
he really did meet with him.” Analyst-1: “what possible reason would Sechin
have to meet with him now, serves no benefit to him.” Case Agent-|: “I really
believe he exaggerates his meetings. He may have been in a meeting where he
was | of 200 people.”

~~

AUTHORIZED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY

a The application also summarized a June 2017 interview of

Klimentov conducted by Special Counsel Mueller’s investigators. In that interview, Klimentov
stated that he was familiar with Page’s visit to Moscow in July 2016 when Page spoke at the
New Economic School, but noted that it was unlikely that Page met with Sechin during this
visit.'?? The final renewal application, however, discounted Klimentov’s supposition that Page
did not meet with Sechin. In particular, the application explained that Klimentov may not have
known about all of Page’s meetings.

125 (U) Zn re Carter W. Page, Order No. 17-375, at 33-34 (nonpublic version).

126 (U) fd. at 34 (nonpublic version).

127 (U) In re Carter W. Page, Order No. 17-679, at 39 (publicly released version).
128 (U) Jd. at 21 (bolding in original omitted) (publicly released version).

29 (U) Interview of U.S. Person-5 dated June 1, 2017 by FBI agents assigned to the Mueller
investigation; see also Redacted OIG Review at 221 n.371 (discussing the OIG’s interviews and
when or whether the statement about the chauffeured car may have been made).

t9 (U) Interview of U.S. Person-S dated June 1, 2017 by FBI agents assigned to the Mueller
investigation at 5, `

<9 4